For ex- ample, the General Assembly regularly encourages states to ratify the Cov- enants and adhere to other international instruments, the United Nations Center for Human Rights and other bodies regularly undertake a variety of informational, educational, and publicity activities, as well as advisory services, such as seminars, fellowships, and consultations. As we shall see below, much of the most important work of the Commission on Human Rights is promotional as well.
And national foreign policies, both bilateral and multilateral, in the First, Second, and Third Worlds alike, regularly involve efforts to promote the national implementation of international hu- man rights standards.
But widespread, vociferous, and usually effective claims of national sov- ereignty meet all efforts to move from general exhortations even to observa- tions and recommendations addressed to the practice of most particular states, revealing the ultimate weakness of the regime. Because its norms are strong-that is, both coherent and widely accepted-the overall strength of the international human rights regime rests on its decision-making proce- dures.
But procedures beyond norm creation, promotion, and information exchange are largely absent. The Universal Declaration established a rela- tively strong declaratory regime, but in the nearly forty years since then, although the regime has grown in strength, only rudimentary, principally promotional procedures have been created.
The Human Rights Committee. These reports are reviewed by the Human Rights Committee, a body of eighteen independent experts. This rather made haphazard procedure has worked better than might be expected because of intert the genuine independence of many of the experts and questioning based on impof information obtained from nongovernmental organizations and other In unofficial sources.
Questioning, in open sessions, is often penetrating; the Committee mina is, for a UN body, remarkably devoid of ideological partisanship; state invol representatives often are fairly responsive; and the questioning, by diplo- open matic standards at least, is neither excessively deferential nor merely pro Protc forma. The procedure has even provoked occasional minor changes in na- whit tional law, and at least a few parties have appeared willing to use their Bu dealings with the Committee as an occasion for a genuine review and reex- amination of national laws, policies, and practices.
But it involves at most only information exchange hum: and the weakest of monitoring mechanisms. And even the information- prim exchange procedures are significantly flawed. Others are farcical: for example, many Soviet-bloc countries have simply reported that Th all the enumerated rights were fully implemented before the Covenants were who! I despite seven reminders, illustrates. Finally, this reporting procedure applies inters only to the parties to the Covenant, which numbered eighty in mid Thus about half the countries of the world are exempt from even this merit: minimal international scrutiny.
Reps Ton J. In its first seven years of operation, through mid, the Committee received communications, with respect to 17 parties to the Optional Protocol. Although 75 were declared inadmissible, discontinued, suspended, or withdrawn, and 44 were still under review, in nearly one-third of its cases the Committee had expressed its views - that is, made a substantive deter- mination on the merits of the case.
Even though 39 of these 55 decisions involved a single country, Uruguay,22 the procedure seems to be relatively open and highly independent, and relatively strong as well. The Optional Protocol provides a genuine, if limited, instance of international monitoring, which in at least a few cases has altered state practice.
But only thirty-five countries had accepted the Optional Protocol by mid- ; that is, only one-fifth of the countries of the world are covered by even this small element of international monitoring of personal, legal, civil, and political rights.
Not surprisingly, almost none of those covered are major human rights violators. As a result, relatively strong procedures apply primarily where they are least needed.
Unfortunately, this is only to be expected, given that participation is entirely voluntary. The Commission on Human Rights, whose central role in norm creation we have already noted, also has impor- tant promotional and monitoring functions.
It should be noted that the Covenant also contains optional provisions Articles for interstate complaints, accepted by eighteen states as of mid, but these have not been and are not likely to be used. A similar questioning procedure is used, but it is somewhat less rigorous, and the fact that the Covenant is explicitly intended to be implemented progressively rather than immediately Article 2 effectively precludes any serious attempt at international monitoring.
Furthermore, there is no complaint procedure parallel to that of the Optional Protocol to the Civil and Political Covenant. Although confidentiality may encourage cooperation by Ml states, it may greatly delay the process and largely precludes an activist role annu for the Commission in the uncovering and spotlighting of violations.
The tion Commission has circumvented some of the strictures of confidentiality by publi publicly announcing a blacklist of countries being studied; the practices of and 2 some twenty-eight countries were examined between and In the case of Equatorial Guinea the tion Commission in instead chose to pursue a public investigation through a Tl special rapporteur, a process less restricted by procedural constraints.
See also Dinah L. Human Rkhts Practice. The Secretariat initially screens the communications. Before PP.
For a Corn petition to reach the Commission, therefore, it must present a very strong prima facie case, and And in ir , the documentation on Uruguay was, with the agreement of the Uru- 11 guayan government, opened to public scrutiny.
Y The procedure, therefore, is in practice largely a promotional device, c involving some very sporadic and limited monitoring. Given the sensitivity of human rights questions, even this may be of real practical value.
Never- it theless, its weakness is evident. The Commission, along with the Secretariat, also undertakes a variety of public information activities and coordinates and encourages the use of advisory services in the field of human rights.
Therefore, it is in many ways the procedural core of the international human rights regime. Political foundations of the international human rights regime The international human rights regime is a relatively strong promotional regime, composed of widely accepted substantive norms, largely inter- nationalized standard-setting procedures, some general promotional activ- An on-site visit did take place, but not under the procedure and only because the offending Macias Nguema regime had been overthrown.
There is no international enge enforcement. Such normative strength and procedural weakness, however, the 1 is the result of conscious political decisions. Al Regimes are political creations to overcome perceived problems arising corn from inadequately regulated or insufficiently coordinated national action. As Krasner puts fron it, in each issue-area there are makers, breakers, and takers of potential It international regimes;30 understanding the structure of a regime or its ab- eve1 sence requires that we know who has played which roles, when and why, intei and what agreements they reached.
In this section I shall examine the in- eve1 teraction of supply and demand which has led to the international human sign rights regime described above. Katzenstein, ed. See C. The Protection of Minorities London: Christoohers. Claude, Jr. John P. O- international principles against gross and persistent systematic violations of ho basic rights-namely, the Universal Declaration followed the next year by Zs, the Convention on Genocide, which was even more clearly a direct legacy 1ts from Hitler.
In the years immediately following the war, how- in- ever, there were willing and able makers, numerous takers, and no an significant breakers of an international human rights regime. The moral and emotional demands for an international human rights regime seem to have he run relatively deep, even in some important national leaders-strong sup- im port came from several countries, including the United States, and none :r- seriously opposed either the Declaration or, later, the Covenants-while no ial countervailing concerns or interests had yet emerged.
Yet prior I. In the Its late Os, human rights became, for the first time, a recognized interna- tional issue-area. As we have seen, procedural innovations have been modest. Even the legal he elaboration of substantive norms has been slow and laborious: for example, nd it took nine years to move from a declaration to a convention on torture; work on stronger, more precise norms on religious liberty is now in its third decade.
It is in this relative constancy of the regime-critics and frustrated optimists are likely to say stagnation-that the weakness of the demand is most evident. Time also revealed both the superficial, merely verbal commitment of definitior many states and substantive disagreements over particular rights, causing impleme! And with the cold war heating up, not only was procedut the desire to move on to other issues strong, but East-West rivalry itself Humal soon came to infect and distort the discussion of human rights.
In the prevent i absence of a power capable of compelling compliance, states participate in position or increase their commitment to international regimes more or less voluntar- The onl ily.
Barring extraordinary circumstances, states participate in an interna- Foreig tional regime only to achieve nationa1 objectives in an environment of skill, for perceived international interdependence, to address national problems crafted i caused by the existing international state of affairs. A stronger international human rights regime sim- politics. They are, however, less tangible, and policy, for better or worse, persiste tends to be made in response to relatively tangible national objectives.
Moral governn interests, which are far less likely to be a major political concern of powerful down, I national actors, also are much more easily lost in the shuffle of the policy- which h making process. They are more subject to political manipulation, because Internal they usually are vaguely expressed and the criteria for determining success But il in realizing moral interests are particularly elusive.
And human rights claims depend4 usually are met, justifiably or not, with the politically potent charge of mis- pendenl guided moralism. National human rights persist. Human rights are also a national matter from the perspective of practical political action. Respecting human rights is extremely inconvenient for a government, even in the best of circumstances. And the less pure the mo- tives of those in power, the more irksome human rights appear.
Who is to prevent a government from succumbing to the temptations and arrogance of position and power? Who can force a government to respect human rights? The only plausible candidates are the people whose rights are at stake. Foreign actors may overthrow a repressive government. With luck and skill, foreign actors may even be able to place good people in charge of finely crafted institutions based on the best of principles.
They may provide tute- lage, supervision, and monitoring; moral and material support; and protec- tion against enemies. A government that respects human rights is almost always the legacy of persistent national political struggles against human rights violations. To learn more, view our Privacy Policy. Log In Sign Up. Download Free PDF.
International Human Rights, 6th edition Daniel J Whelan. Jack Donnelly. Download PDF. A short summary of this paper. International Human Rights, 6th edition. This reflected a particular understanding of 33 sovereignty, a central organizing principle of international relations for the 34 past three and a half centuries.
A major purpose of this book is to 2 chronicle the ways in which, over the past seventy years, human rights have 3 produced fundamental changes in understandings and practices of state 4 sovereignty. In the s British novelist and activist H. Wells cast much 14 of his advocacy for social reform in terms of a global regime committed to 15 human rights. Such efforts, however, represented only a small fringe of civil 16 society. And not a 20 single state endorsed the idea that governments had international legal human 21 rights obligations to their own citizens.
Roosevelt framed the Allied war effort in 28 terms of securing four fundamental freedoms: of speech, of religion, from 29 want, and from fear. This initial statement was further elaborated by Roose- 30 velt and British prime minister Winston Churchill, who negotiated a state- 31 ment of Allied war aims in the Atlantic Charter of August Before the war, little was done to aid Jews trying to flee Germany 4 and surrounding countries.
Some who escaped were even denied refuge by 5 Allied governments, including the United States. During the war, no effort 6 was made to impede the functioning of the death camps.
The Allies did not 7 even target the railway lines that brought hundreds of thousands to the 8 slaughter at Auschwitz and other camps. As the 13 war came to an end, though, Allied leaders and citizens, previously preoccu- 14 pied with military victory, belatedly began to confront this horror.
But they were only the tip of the iceberg. Even more radical 8 was the creation in of the Commission on Human Rights under the 9 auspices of the U. The Com- 10 mission quickly began to define these abstract statements of postwar 11 optimism and goodwill. The Commission quickly decided to focus 17 its attention on the first part of the bill, which in became the Universal 18 Declaration of Human Rights.
Each, along with the chair of both the Commission and the drafting 26 committee, Eleanor Roosevelt of the United States, played a major role in 27 shaping the Declaration. General Assembly on December 10, 35 December 10 is thus celebrated globally as Human Rights Day. South Africa abstained because of the pro- 39 visions on racial equality. And the 8 countries that later achieved independence were at least as enthusiastic in 9 their embrace of the Declaration as those who voted for it in They are endowed with 16 reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 17 brotherhood.
An extensive series of 23 civil and political rights are recognized in Articles 3—15 and 19—21, includ- 24 ing rights to life, liberty, and security of person; an array of legal protections 25 and civil liberties; and the right to political participation.
Articles 16—18 and 26 22—27 recognize a wide range of economic, social, and cultural rights, 27 including rights to an adequate standard of living, social security, work, rest 28 and leisure, family, education, and participation in the cultural life of the 29 community. It is the most translated 32 document in human history, at official translations. After quite a bit of 3 debate, however, in the General Assembly directed the Commission to 4 include economic, social, cultural, and political rights as well.
In addition, there was significant 6 disagreement over monitoring and adjudication mechanisms and a proposed 7 reporting procedure for economic, social, and cultural rights.
After much debate, in both the Commission and the broader 12 United Nations, the General Assembly in directed the Commission to 13 draft separate Covenants on civil and political rights and on economic, 14 social, and cultural rights. To guarantee the notion of unity, though, the 15 two Covenants, once completed, were to be simultaneously adopted by the 16 General Assembly.
The documentary record, however, tells a different story. But their biggest divide 22 by far was over monitoring the implementation of the Covenant s and 23 adjudicating disputes between states over violations. Most countries agreed 24 that the United Nations should play more of an advisory rather than an 25 enforcement role see Chapter 4.
The Soviet Union and its allies, however, 26 rejected any form of monitoring or oversight by the United Nations. A coalition of cold warriors, isolationists, and racists 30 who did not want additional international scrutiny of legalized racial dis- 31 crimination in the United States forced newly elected president Eisenhower 32 to agree not to support any human rights treaty that would emerge from 33 the United Nations.
On the Commission, the United States began to argue 34 that perhaps the best way to ensure human rights would be through the pro- 35 vision of technical assistance and support to countries, rather than through 36 binding treaties. There, the Third Committee 39 where human rights issues are considered dithered over the drafts for 40 01 International ch In addition, the delay reflected a 3 shift in focus of the growing bloc of postcolonial states toward fighting colo- 4 nialism and racism.
They state the minimum social and political guarantees 19 recognized by the international community as necessary for a life of dignity 20 in the contemporary world. Table 1. By ratifying the 31 Covenants, states agree to comply with certain reporting procedures. This 32 opens them to multilateral scrutiny. It does not, though, as we will see in 33 some detail in Chapter 5, provide international enforcement or implementa- 34 tion of human rights.
In Economic and Social Council 38 Resolution authorized the Commission on Human Rights to discuss 39 human rights violations in particular countries. In the racial discrimina- 40 tion convention came into force, requiring parties to file periodic reports on 01 International ch It is an 6 intergovernmental organization IGO , established by a multilateral treaty 7 the U. Charter among sovereign states, who are its members. Delegates 8 to the United Nations represent states, not the international community, let 9 alone individuals whose rights are violated.
This may be of little comfort to victims. We cannot, however, 15 ignore the severe limits imposed by state sovereignty in assessing the human 16 rights achievements of the United Nations and other intergovernmental 17 organizations.
Although practice fell short of rhetoric, these bilateral 30 initiatives helped to open space for new ways of thinking about and acting 31 on international human rights concerns, as we will see in some detail in 32 Chapters 7 and 8.
Such groups act as advocates for 36 victims of human rights violations by publicizing violations and lobbying to 37 alter the practices of states and international organizations. Best known is 38 Amnesty International AI , which received the Nobel Peace Prize in 39 and has more than seven million members and supporters. Chapter 9 briefly 40 examines transnational human rights advocacy. Economic and Social Council adopts Procedure petitions 19 mechanism 20 Helsinki Accords link human rights protections to security cooperation 21 in Europe International Covenants enter into force 22 Amnesty International wins Nobel Peace Prize; U.
New 5 treaties were adopted on discrimination against women , torture 6 , and the rights of the child Schedule a Visit. The Josef Korbel School at the University of Denver is preparing the next generation of thinkers, do-ers and leaders to take on the great issues of our time.
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